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I. Response to Dr. Baruch's Statement of Course of Proceedings. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Baruch") incorrectly states that 
the Defendant! Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Bill") requested "two pre-trial rulings" from 
the magistrate court. 1 Bill never requested any pretrial rulings nor did he file any pretrial 
motions with the court and Dr. Baruch's claims in this regard are contradicted by the record in 
this case. 
Dr. Baruch alleges that Bill sought two pretrial rulings, the first of which she claims that 
Bill requested a ruling that because his real estate development projects were under water he 
"wanted essentially all of the community assets.,,2 She further alleges that Bill requested the trial 
court to "rule as a matter of law ... that since the balance in his retirement account on the day of 
trial was less than it was on the day of marriage, that automatically it was all Appellant's 
separate property.,,3 The record reflects in this case that Bill never file a single pretrial motion 
and certainly did not request any ruling "as a matter of law" on any issue. Notably, Dr. Baruch 
fails to cite to anywhere in the record where such claims are supported. 
What actually transpired was that the magistrate court requested both parties to submit 
pretrial briefing on two specific issues that were likely to arise at trial: Bill's retirement account 
and the valuation of Bill's development entities that were financially challenged. (R., p. 155.) 
The court ordered the parties to submit the pretrial briefs no later than December 18, 2009. (R., 
p. 155.) 
I Respondent's Brief, p. 2. 
2 !d. at 2-3. 
3 Id. at 2-3. 
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Dr. Baruch argued that although Bill's development companies were underwater, that 
they should be awarded to him at a zero value. Bill argued that the entities should be awarded to 
him at their actual value. She further claims that with regard to Bill's argument that the Court 
"denied that obvious inequitable claim." The court issued no ruling on the pretrial briefs and the 
record will reflect that the court did not enter a single pretrial order. (R., p. 4-6.) Notably, Dr. 
Baruch fails to cite to any alleged motion or any order. 
The trial was originally scheduled to occur on October 1,2009, but was later rescheduled 
for October 30, 2009. (R., p. 4.) The parties stipulated to vacate the October 30th trial date and it 
was rescheduled for March 31, 2010. (R., p. 5.) The court requested the parties to 
pretrial briefing on the issues related to the valuation of Bill's business entities and Bill's 
retirement account and those briefs were due on December 18, 2009. (R., p. 155.) Both pm 
submitted the briefing to the court. Dr. Baruch alleges that Bill requested pretrial rulings on 
these issues and the court denied his requests; those statements are simply not true. The court 
requested briefing on the issue of the valuation of the business and the retirement account. It was 
Bill's position that because the entities had negative values, that they should be awarded to him 
at a negative value. (R., p. 155.) Dr. Baruch argued that they should be awarded to Bill at no 
value, despite the fact that the parties had executed personal guarantees on the debt in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Court made no rulings in the affirmative or negative 
based upon the parties' pretrial briefs and issued no pretrial orders. Furthermore, Dr. B~ruch's 
incorrect statement that certain claims of Bill's were "denied" by the court makes no sense in 
light of the fact that the court permitted Bill to present evidence and argue the issues at trial. 
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After the magistrate received the briefing status conferences were held on December 22, 
2009 and January 27, 2010. There are no transcripts from the status conferences, there are no 
motions in the court file, and there are no oral or written orders. 
Contrary to Dr. Baruch's claims about Bill changing his position at trial, it was Dr. 
Baruch who abandoned her argument that Bill should be awarded the businesses at zero values at 
the time of trial. Dr. Baruch has disregarded the court record and misstates the procedural 
history of this case. 
II. Response to Dr. Baruch's Statement of the Facts and Corrections to Appellant's 
Statement of Facts. 
Bill will respond to Dr. Baruch's corrections to Bill's statement of facts in the order 
addressed in her brief. 
A. Dr. Baruch directs this Court to page 8 of Appellant's Brief that states, "after Bill 
and Dr. Baruch were married, no funds were put into the Veltex Building, LLC" and notes that 
the citation is incorrect. The citation in the brief directed the Court to Tr. Vol. I, p. 418, L. 15-
19. This citation does contain a typographical error; the correct citation is to page 412, not page 
418, and the transcript provides: 
Q. After the time you and Amy, did you put any money into Veltex Building, 
LLC? 
A. No. 
Mr. Bevis: After what? 
Mr. Welsh: After their marriage. 
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(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 412, L. 15-19.) The factual statement contained in Bill's brief that no funds were 
put into Veltex Building, LLC after marriage is correct and is supported by the record; the brief 
simply contained the incorrect page number. 
B. Bill Clark did testify that he received a capital gains distribution from Veltex 
Building, LLC in the amount of $342,149 which was deposited directly into his Charles Schwab 
account and then used towards the acquisition of the Ketchum Condominium. Bill cited to Tr., 
Vol 1, P. 421, L. 4-16, p. 422, L 4-9, Defendant's Exhibit 596, Bate Stamp 1283, and Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 232. Dr. Baruch correctly notes that this testimony was objected to at trial and the 
objection was overruled. The testimony is supported by the transcript. 
C. Dr. Baruch claims that Exhibit 517 A was not admitted at trial despite the fact that 
Exhibit 517 A is clearly marked as "admitted" in the Clerk's Record. There was no objection 
filed by Dr. Baruch to the Clerk's Record. Nonetheless, Bill does agree that the transcript does 
not appear to reflect that Exhibit 517 A was one of the exhibits that was admitted. Bill does not 
rely "heavily" on this exhibit as asserted by Dr. Baruch and if this Court so chooses not to 
consider it as being admitted it does not alter or subtract from Bill's argument. 
D. Dr. Baruch characterizes Bill's statement that he did not withdraw to himself 
IRA funds as being a clever, but misleading choice of words. Bill did refer to the transfer of 
funds as "rollovers" because that is what they were-they were rolled over into other retirement 
accounts. This is the crux of Bill's argument and the basic foundation that supports his position; 
there is a key difference between transferring funds between retirement accounts and transferring 
or withdrawing funds out of a retirement account into a non-retirement account. Dr. Baruch's 
claim that the funds were "spent on his investments" is not correct. The funds were rolled over 
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into two other retirement accounts: Pensco Trust and Sterling Trust. Both of these retirement 
accounts are self-directed plans that do provide the individual with the ability to direct how 
retirement dollars are invested. Dr. Baruch blames Bill for the fact that some of the investrn. 
did not turn out to be profitable, nonetheless, the funds were not "spent." 
Bill is compelled to respond to Dr. Baruch's statement of the facts and briefly addresses 
some inaccuracies below. 
Schwab Retirement Accounts 
With regard to the Schwab Retirement Accounts, Dr. Baruch incorrectly claims that "Bill 
and his attorney conceded at trial that said amount was her separate property.,,4 Notably, iigalH, 
Dr. Baruch fails to cite to any place in the transcript where any such concession was made. 
Rather she cites to Bill's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R., p. 441, 
32.) As set forth in detail in Appellant's Brief, it is Bill's position-and it has always been 
Bill's position-that both he and Dr. Baruch's retirement accounts should be treated in the same 
manner. Bill's position has remained the same, which is that if Dr. Baruch were to be awarded 
the balance in her account on the date of marriage as her separate property, so too should Bill. 
This position is reflected in Bill's discussion of the treatment of his retirement account in 
same Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and as reflected on Exhibit A attached 
to his brief. (R., p. 439-40, 458 item 30.) 
4 Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7. 
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Dr. Baruch discusses Bill's "withdrawals" from his Schwab 3713 IRA; however the 
evidence at trial established that Bill did not withdraw any substantial funds from his account. 5 
Rather, Bill rolled over some of his retirement funds from the Schwab 3713 IRA into two other 
retirement accounts, but did not take distributions from his IRA. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 434, L. 5-9.) 
All funds were rolled over and transferred between two other retirement accounts Pensco Trust 
and Sterling Trust. Bill testified at trial that all three of the accounts, Schwab 3713 IRA, Pensco 
Trust and Sterling Trust are all IRAs in his name. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 483, L. 9-18.) 
Dr. Baruch points to Plaintiff's Exhibit 235 and claims that the community contributed 
funds to the account during marriage. However, the community also contributed significant 
funds to her account during marriage so there is no distinction between the two. She also argues 
that Bill's account fluctuated during marriage and it was unclear what percentage of the decrease 
in value was a result of market conditions and of that percentage was community and separate 
funds. Again, there is no way to determine which portion of her accounts were community or 
separate either, but this did not prevent the court from determining that the balance in her 
account on the date of marriage was separate property. 
Ketchum Condominium Trace 
It was undisputed at trial that Bill acquired his ownership interest in Veltex Building, 
LLC prior to marriage. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 412, L. 1-5; p. 232, L. 4-8; Defendant's Exhibit 517.) It 
was undisputed at trial that after the parties were married, no funds were put into Veltex 
5 As the magistrate court noted, Bill received one de minimus distribution in the amount of $ I ,495.24 in 2007. (R., 
p.570.) 
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Building, LLC. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 418, L. 15-19.) Therefore, all capital contributions made by Bill 
were contributed before the parties were married. Bill testified that the $342,149 he received on 
February 7, 2007 were capital gains. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 420, 6-15.) Dr. Baruch presented no 
evidence or testimony to rebut or even contradict this evidence. 
Rather, Dr. Baruch argues that the distribution is presumed to be income because it was 
received during the marriage. As addressed in more detail below, this analysis is flawed because 
the character of property attaches on the date of acquisition-Bill's interest in Veltex Building, 
LLC was acquired prior to marriage. Dr. Baruch further argues that the $342,149 was 
"generated" as a result of Bill's "labor" and "sweat equity." (R., p. 588.) However, Bill was 
already being compensated for his labor through Clark Development, LLC. Bill testified that 
none of the equity in Veltex Building, LLC was due to any sweat equity because Clark 
Development, LLC was paid a fee for developing the project. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 626, L. 11-28.) 
Bill historically has received a draw from Clark Development, LLC after expenses are paid, 
which is his primary source of income. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 238.) In 2009, he was receiving income 
of $15,000 per month until April of 2009. (/d.) As of January 2010, Clark Development, LLC 
was receiving income of $15,000, which after expenses were paid Bill received approximately 
$8,500 per month. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 244.) Therefore, to the extent that the community contributed 
any sweat equity or labor towards the project after marriage, Bill was compensated for that labor 
through his income from Clark Development, LLC. Dr. Baruch failed to establish or even 
present any evidence to support a claim that the community was not adequately compensated. 
Finally, Dr. Baruch's claim that Bill avoided the question regarding when construction 
was begun or completed is not supported by the transcript. Bill's testimony was as follows: 
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Mr. Bevis: And do you recognize that publication? 
Bill: Not specifically. I certainly know what it's about. 
Q. It does say that the Veltex Building was completed III 2004; IS that 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is that accurate? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 511, L. 19-25.) From this testimony, it is hard to see how this testimony could be 
characterized as anything but direct. There is no testimony in the transcript where Bill 
about when construction commenced and did not respond or attempted to avoid the question. 
III. Response to Dr. Baruch's Request for Attorney Fees. 
Dr. Baruch requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 
claiming that this Appeal is pursued frivolously. Dr. Baruch requested attorney fees from the 
district court on the same grounds. The district court denied the request and her subsequent 
motion to reconsider. (R., p. 841.) Dr. Baruch did not appeal those orders to this Court. 
Bill has not pursued this appeal frivolously and there is no basis for fees under Idaho 
Code Section 12-121. 
This Court set forth the requirements for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-121: 
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a 
matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when 
the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the 
case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. V 
Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001). 
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When deciding whether the case was brought, pursued, or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the 
entire course of the litigation must be taken into account. Id 
Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may 
not be awarded under I.C. Section 12-121 even though the losing 
party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. Although an award of 
attorney fees under the statue is discretionary, the award must be 
supported by findings, and those findings, in tum, must be 
supported by the record. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 
792,41 P.3d 220 (2002). 
McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833,844 (2003) (emphasis added). 
"Fees under I.e. § 12-121 are not awarded to a prevailing party as a matter of right but, 
rather, are subject to the district court's discretion." Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 29U, L"l-O 
P.3d 391, 399 (2010). "A district court should only award fees 'when it is left with the abiding 
belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, 0[, 
foundation.'" C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76,82 (2001). "However, 'when 
a party pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to 
be frivolous and without foundation.'" /d. "A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because 
the district court concludes that it fails as a matter of law." Gulf Chern. Employees Fed Credit 
Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). "Furthermore, 'f31 
misperception of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. 
Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly 
fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. '" Snipes v. 
Schalo, 130 Idaho 890,893,950 P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App.1997). 
Bill's appeal was not brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Dr. 
Baruch fails to present any argument or analysis explaining how or why she believes Bill's 
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appeal was frivolous. Rather, she just makes the sweeping statement that Bill simply invited this 
Court to second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. Bill did not invite this 
second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. Bill submitted extensive briefing to 
Court on appeal, not second-guessing conflicting evidence, but disputing the legal analysis and 
the application of the law to the facts. 
It is Bill's position that this appeal was not brought frivolously or unreasonably since the 
magistrate court's decision to deny Bill's separate property claims was an abuse of discretion in 
that insufficient evidence to support those findings was presented to the magistrate court. The 
district court erred in affirming the magistrate's holding. 
IV. Response to Dr. Baruch's Standards of Review. 
Dr. Baruch infers on page 18, at footnote 7, that Bill incorrectly stated as fact 
magistrate found that the distribution Bill received was a capital gain. Bill made no such 
incorrect statement. Bill stated in the procedural history portion of his brief that "The magistrate 
further held that the capital gains distribution Bill received on one of his separate business 
entities was community and therefore he was not entitled to any reimbursement..." (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 5.) The magistrate stated in his Memorandum Decision and Order, 
Bill's argument rests on the undisputed fact that he received a distribution from 
Veltex Building LLC shortly before making the down payment on the Ketchum 
condominium, and relies on the presumption that the entire amount he received 
was his separately. This presumption appears to be based on his belief that capital 
gains from a separate asset received during marriage are separate property, a 
proposition that the Court can find no support. 
(R., p. 582.) The Court found that a capital gain earned on separate property is not separate 
property. 
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The Court later corrected this statement of the law after Bill filed his Motion to Alter or 
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In the Order Re: Motion to Alter or Amend 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment the magistrate stated, "The Court corrects 
the statement found on page 22, lines 12-15, in the Conclusions of Law that' ... capital gains from 
a separate asset received during marriage are separate property ... ' because the court meant to say 
that capital gains from separate assets are not always separate property." (R., p. 680.) 
V. The District Court Did Err in Affirming the Magistrate's Finding That the 
Entirety of Bill's Charles Schwab SEPIIRA # ... 3713 was Community Property. 
Dr. Baruch argues that the holdings in Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 822 P.2d 982 
(1991) and McCoy v. McCoy, 125 Idaho 199,868 P.2d 527 (Ct.App.l994) should only apply 
where an account increases in value and not where an account decreases in value, but provides 
no rationale for why such a distinction should be drawn. Under this analysis, the community 
would reap all of the benefit, but not share in any of the risks associated with investing. 
Dr. Baruch incorrectly states that Bill Clark "withdrew" funds from his account and relies 
upon Plaintiffs Exhibit 235 which was a document she prepared. The actual supporting account 
statements from Charles Schwab reflect that Bill did not take distributions.6 (Defendant's 
Exhibits 642-648.) All funds were rolled over and transferred between two other retirement 
accounts Pensco Trust and Sterling Trust. Bill testified at trial that all three of the accounts, 
Schwab 3713 IRA, Pensco Trust and Sterling Trust are all IRAs in his name. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 
6 As the magistrate court noted, Bill received one de minimus distribution in the amount 0[$1,495.24 in 2007. (R., 
p.570.) 
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483, L. 9-18.) All of which are essentially one, big IRA held in three different entities. (/d.) 
There were transfers and investments made within each of them during the marriage. (Id.) Bill 
never made any withdrawals to himself from any of the three accounts. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 483, L. 
19-22.) 
It has always been Bill's position that the analysis under McCoy and Maslen control, but 
that the analysis is equally applicable to both his and Dr. Baruch's accounts. The magistrate 
court provided no rationale or explanation as to how it arrived at its conclusion to award Dr. 
Baruch the balance of her 401(k) on the date of marriage. At the conclusion of the trial the 
magistrate found that Bill's account was distinguishable from the Maslen and McCoy cases 
because (1) he "withdrew" funds and (2) because the community contributed to the account after 
marriage and therefore the account was commingled and could not be traced. (R., p. 585.) 
The community made significant contributions to Dr. Baruch's account and the account 
increased in value by nearly $400,000 during marriage. On the date of marriage, Bill's account 
was valued at $386,636. The magistrate court found that the community made contributions 
towards Bill's account and that the account was community because it was comingled with 
community funds. However, community funds were contributed to both accounts and therefore 
both accounts have been comingled. There is no way to determine on either of the accounts 
whether it was the separate portion or community portion of the accounts that increased or 
decreased in value. The magistrate court's finding that Bill withdrew funds was not supported 
by the evidence as there was no evidence that any funds were withdrawn from the Schwab 3713 
IRA. 
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Dr. Baruch argues that there was a stipulation that her account funds were separate. 
There was no such stipulation. Mr. Welsh stated at the hearing on the Motion for Leave to Alter 
or Amend: 
Mr. Welsh: And I want to make it clear, Your Honor, I think the court knows 
we never conceded. We took the same argument with her account as we did to 
my client's account. I think the court knows that. When you say counsel tried to 
suggest to you that we conceded the separate property, I don't think the court 
hopefully believes that. We argued as to both accounts, they were separate based 
upon Maslen and McCoy. 
Court: They were separate at the time of marriage. 
Mr. Welsh: Yes, Your Honor. Exactly. And stayed separate at the time of 
divorce, that portion under our analysis from Maslen and McCoy. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 666, L. 10-23.) It has always been Bill's position that Maslen and McCoy apply 
equally to both his retirement and Dr. Baruch's retirement account. Dr. Baruch's claim that Bill 
did not raise this argument until the appeal is simply incorrect and contradicted by the record. 
Either Maslen and McCoy apply to both or they apply to neither; his position on appeal is 
entirely consistent. He has argued, among other things, that the magistrate erred by applying the 
cases to Dr. Baruch's account and not to his. 
Finally, Dr. Baruch suggests that the district court's conclusion that Bill stipulated to the 
treatment of Dr. Baruch's retirement account as being her separate property when the district 
court relied upon a portion of the transcript where Bill made a concession related to an entirely 
different account is simply harmless error; this mistake is far from harmless error. 7 It is hard to 
fathom how the district court's conclusion that a stipulation was made by Bill and in support of 
7 As set forth in detail in Appellant's Brief, the district court found that Bill conceded that Dr. Baruch's 401(k) was 
her separate property and relied on the following testimony, "Are you claiming any interest in that IRA?" "No, I 
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that conclusion relies on a portion of the transcript where Bill stipulated to an entirely different 
account can amount to harmless error. To the contrary, this constitutes error because the 
conclusion is not supported by the evidence in the record. 
Dr. Baruch label's Bill as "greedy" and "litigious" simply because it is his position that 
the balance of his retirement account on the date of their marriage is his separate property, just as 
the balance of her retirement account on the date of their marriage was deemed her separate 
property. 
The magistrate court abused its discretion because it failed to act within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable rules and its decision was HUl 
made with an exercise of reason. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 195, 765 P.2d 1094, 1097 
(Ct.App.1988). The district court erred in affirming the magistrate's decision. 
VI. The District Court Did Err in Affirming the Magistrate's Finding that the 
Capital Gains Distribution was Community Property. 
Dr. Baruch's entire argument regarding Bill's Veltex distribution is based upon the 
magistrate court's incorrect application of the law. She argues that the $342,149 capital 
distribution that was made during the marriage was properly deemed income by the court 
because the court found that significant labor and efforts were contributed to the project during 
marriage. 
It was undisputed at trial that Bill acquired his ownership interest in Veltex Building, 
LLC prior to marriage. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 412, L. 1-5; p. 232, L. 4-8; Defendant's Exhibit 517.) It 
don't claim any interest in it." "We will agree to treat it as separate property." (R., p. 834) Bill was referring to 
Exhibit 234 which was a small IRA with a value of approximately $3,361. He was not testifYing about the 401(k). 
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was undisputed at trial that after the parties were married, no funds were put into Veltex 
Building, LLC. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 418, L. 15-19.) Therefore, all capital contributions made by Bill 
were contributed before the parties were married. Bill's interest in the entity was acquired 
to marriage, not during marriage. Dr. Baruch presumes that because the funds were disbursed 
during marriage that the date of the disbursement is the date the asset is characterized. However, 
under Idaho law, the character of property vests at the time the property is acquired. Winn v. 
Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 815, 673 P.2d 411, 415 (1983). Bill testified that the $342,194 was a 
capital gains distribution. Dr. Baruch presented no evidence or testimony to rebut or even 
contradict this evidence. 
Significantly, Dr. Baruch completely ignored and did not even address Bill's legal 
analysis discussing the Speer, Swope, and Wolford line of cases. It appears that she dov 
disagree with Bill's legal analysis. 
Bill agrees and does not dispute that he must trace the funds applied to the Ketchum 
Condominium to his separate property to a reasonable degree of certainty. Bill has met that 
burden. The magistrate court erred in its conclusion that the capital gains distribution was 
income and that it was income because the community had contributed efforts towards Bill's 
separate property. Under Idaho law, the party seeking reimbursement as a result of alleged 
community contribution with respect to separate property has the burden of proving that 
community expenditures have enhanced the value of the separate property and the amount of the 
enhancement. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 173,898 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1995); Josephson v. 
Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989); Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 
P.2d 1169, (1976); Hooker v. Hooker, 95 Idaho 518, 511 P.2d, 800 (1972); and Swope v. Swope, 
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122 Idaho 296, 834 P.2d 298 (1992) (emphasis added) (hereinafter referred to as Swope II). 
With regard to the burden of proof, the Supreme Court has ruled that, not only must the party 
claiming a community reimbursement from a separate property business demonstrate that 
value of the business increased during the years of the marriage, the party must also demonstrate 
why the value ofthe separate property business increased. Swope, supra. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at trial as to any community efforts or 
labor were expended towards Veltex Building, LLC. Rather, the magistrate simply assumed 
such labor based purely upon the fact that construction of the building occurred during the 
marriage and stated, " ... my finding was based upon my determination that it was more prooaolc 
than not that Mr. Clark put a significant amount of effort into this project in the planning, 
building, and selling of the units after they were married." (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 678-679.) 
addressed in Appellant's Brief, even if the court's finding that labor was expended were 
supported by the evidence, the community was compensated by Bill's monthly paycheck from 
Clark Development, LLC. Clark Development, LLC was paid a fee for developing the project. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p. 626, L. 11-28.) Bill has fully addressed this legal analysis in his appeal brief and 
Dr. Baruch has not responded at all to the legal arguments set forth therein, so Bill will not 
reiterate that argument here. 
With regard to Dr. Baruch's claim that Bill's accounting in tracing the actual funds 
contained errors. First she argues that Bill did not account for the $1,631.60 in community 
dividends and interest added to the Schwab account in February and the $1,943.23 in community 
and dividends added to the account in March. With regard to the $1,943.23 in dividends, of that 
amount $1,904.50 of those dividends were added on March 30, 2007, which is after the $176,000 
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was withdrawn on March 27th and is therefore after the relevant time period. (Defendant's 
Exhibit 596, bates stamp 1294.) If the Court deems that it is appropriate, Bill has no objection 
reducing the $107,146.07 by $1,670.33 ($38.73 for March dividends + $1,631.60 
February dividends). 
Most significantly, Dr. Baruch incorrectly states that the $10,000 check was withdrawn 
on March 28,2007 after the $176,000 check cleared."g However, Defendant's Exhibit 596, bates 
stamp 1293 reflects that the $176,000 check and the $10,000 check both cleared on the same 
day; March 28, 2007. It does not show that the $10,000 check cleared before the $176,000 
check. Significantly, and in support of Bill's argument, the $10,000 check was written on IVldflii 
26, 2007, one day before the $176,000 check written on March 2ih. (Defendant's Exhibit 596, 
bates stamps 1306-07.) 
The Veltex capital gains distribution was Bill's separate property and Bill traced those 
funds to a reasonable degree of certainty to the acquisition of the Ketchum condominium and is 
entitled to be reimbursed for those funds. 
VII. Conclusion 
Bill respectfully requests this Court to grant his appeal and reverse the district court and 
conclude that the balance of Bill's IRA on the date of marriage is his separate property and 
therefore the account, since it is less than that balance, is Bill's separate property. In the 
alternative, if this Court characterizes Bill's account as community, then Bill respectfully 
requests the Court to hold that Dr. Baruch's account should also be characterized as community 
property. Bill further respectfully requests this Court to conclude that he is entitled to 
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reimbursement in the amount of $107,146.07 for his separate property contributions towards the 
acquisition ofthe Ketchum Condominium. 
DATED: April 25, 2012 COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
By: \~l~~-
MA'tKENZIE W COTT 
Attorneys for Defen anti Appellant 
8 Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (emphasis original). 
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